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BOOK REVIEW
Legal and Political Challenges of Governing the Environment and Climate
Change: Ruling Nature
Gary Wickham and Jo-Ann Goodie (Eds)
Routledge, London, 2013. 154 pp., $135.00 (hardback), ISBN 978-0-415-67464-5
This book’s first author is a Professor of Sociology, and its second author is a
Senior Lecturer in Law. As such this very well-written work combines a rich
breadth of scholarship and erudition uncommon in the specifically legal literature
on climate change, and perhaps in the wider literature on the environment also.
The book as a whole is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is concerned
to delineate what the authors describe as ‘legal–political government’, a con-
ception that runs throughout the chapters to come as their central motif. The
work as a whole is a little light on the legal aspects of the environment (‘environ-
mental law’), and one waits some time for law and policy pertaining to climate
change to be engaged directly (Chapter 6); however this provides opportunity
for space to be devoted to a spectrum of other interesting, inter-related issues.
In this regard, the text evokes fundamental questions pertaining to the nature
and origins of law, and the functional and ethical parameters pertinent to the gov-
ernance of the environment.
What, then, is to be understood by ‘legal–political government’? Chapter 1
commences the development of the concept. Here, the authors proceed to identify
and map out ‘two rival understandings of human nature’, which are
developed in such a way as to underpin two rival versions of . . . law,
which in turn have gone on to underpin two rival approaches to govern-
ment, one of which informs legal–political government. (pp. 2–3)
The first of these two understandings is ‘built around the idea of perfectibility’:
By this perfectionist way of thinking, while humans are not always perfect
they will always strive towards perfection because nature is ultimately
perfect and is therefore always, of necessity, seeking to return that
which it has produced to perfection. (p. 3)
This position cannot be reduced accurately to a simple summary here, but for
present purposes it is a position that is loosely analogous to conventional
notions of ‘natural law’ and attendant idealistic conceptions of quasi-transcendent
moral value. The authors assert that this tradition is associated with
the basis of the most enduring form of opposition to legal–political gov-
ernment, usually featuring the idea that reason-based morality and/or
religion are more powerful than law and politics, that law and politics





























have their place, but must know that their place is below morality and/or
religion. (p. 3)
The second understanding that the authors seek to distinguish holds instead
that:
humans are not perfect; their disquietude and constant violence make this
empirically obvious . . . and we should develop techniques to help us
avoid the dangers of nature, especially the dangers of the uncontrolled
passions of fractious humans. (p. 3)
Notwithstanding a degree of fluidity between both positions—the ‘world is too
complex for that’ to be otherwise (p. 15)—this latter ‘anti-perfectionist’ understand-
ing is favoured overwhelmingly by the authors. It is ‘[t]his tradition [that] is the basis
of legal–political government.’ (p. 4)
Whilst ‘[t]he perfectionist position holds that the earthly laws of earthly rulers
and the earthly politics in which they engage must always be subservient to exter-
nally sourced natural law’, the authors’ alternative view holds that ‘there can be
no force superior to the sovereign’ (but provided that he/she/it seeks to use the
facility to rule to limit ‘dangers posed by uncontrolled passions’; p. 5). A
tension strung between these binary polarities pervades the book, and in it one
sees reflected aspects of the traditional conflict between ‘natural law’ and ‘legal
positivism’, as exemplified by the classic debate between HLA Hart (1958) and
Fuller (1958). As the book unfolds, it progressively builds into the conception of
legal–political government the notion of ‘interests’, which constitute the presence
of competing norms and which extend to the overriding norm of legal–political
government, described as ‘civil peace’:
the sole norm of legal–political government is: the pursuit of the widest
possible appreciable spread of peace, security, well-being, and prosperity
among the humans within each territory being governed (this norm is
sometimes referred to simply by the term ‘civil peace’ . . . ). (p. 13)
Structurally the book is very clearly laid out, and stylistically it is consistently
dynamic and engaging. Chapter 2 proceeds to develop the notion of legal–
political government introduced in Chapter 1; Chapter 3 examines the environ-
ment with respect to aesthetics and science in the context of legal–political
government, with the discussion beginning in the eighteenth century and
moving towards more recent times; Chapter 4 is more overtly ‘legalistic’, engaging
with ‘the private common-law mode of governing the environment’ (p. 66) and
according particular attention to ‘toxic tort’, with further particular attention
accorded to risk (pp. 72–89); Chapter 5 is similarly legalistic, and considers the
public law government of the environment; Chapter 6 engages directly with
climate change; and Chapter 7 provides a summative conclusion, making refer-
ence to two Australian case studies pertinent to climate change.
It should be clear from the above that the book possesses significant merits.
This notwithstanding, the work contains a range of problematic features. Space
precludes detailed exploration of these matters, but a sense of their scope and
character may be offered.
Chapter 6 (concerning climate change) is consistently troubled by inadequate
acknowledgement of the scientific consensus on anthropogenic global warming.






























approach to the dangers of climate change leads to policies ‘which are increasingly
based on feelings and intuition rather than evidence and facts’ (p. 127, quoting
Frank Furedi); ‘uncertainty has intensified “in the light of an even newer
science [ecological science] . . . one that is consulted less for the knowledge it
offers than the doubt it insinuates”’ (p. 120 (authors’ parentheses and insertion),
quoting Francois Ewald). As a consequence of saturating the text with these
sorts of points, the authors’ brief acknowledgement of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change’s crucial assessment of man’s negative contribution to
anthropogenic global warming (at p. 117) strikes the reader as a largely inconse-
quential passing note.
The concept of legal–political government itself is also pervaded by what
some may consider to be an unnecessarily bleak view of humanity. Witness the
miserable view of natural man drawn from the philosophy of Samuel von
Pufendorf (at p. 23, drawing on Ian Hunter) wherein Pufendorf entirely edits
out of the human character notions such as empathy and kindness. Similarly,
witness Alfred Wallace’s glorification of the ‘positive checks’ of a natural order
that ‘keeps down the population of savage races’ to the benefit of ‘more civilized
peoples’ (p. 63); Wallace’s passage as fully quoted in the book is remarkable for its
ability to condense imperialism, elitism and racism into so short and potent a
space of words. Legal–political government is not predicated upon these ideas
per se, but packing them around the circumference of its conceptual development
may be suggestive of a radically bleak view of humanity at play within its frame-
work. An ‘anti-perfectionist understanding of nature’ is an understanding ‘by
which humans are naturally imperfect and more likely to be destructive than
peaceful’ (p. 46), and ‘today’s citizens in law-and-politics countries are . . . con-
trolled by fear’ (p. 27). It is argued that
nature will allow the strongest possible ruler . . . to win control and to use
this control to calm the destructive tendencies of those being ruled
(because nature has instilled in those being ruled a fear of death and,
hence, a fear of the individual or assembly who or which can, as unchal-
lenged ruler, impose death on them). (p. 46)
To some these sorts of ideas—in the tradition of Hobbes’ Leviathan and perhaps
redolent of Machiavelli’s The Prince—may seem deeply pessimistic. Where a
reader does not recognize his or her fundamental understanding of humanity in
such a vision, it may make the notion of legal–political government considerably
more difficult to accept.
Furthermore, the book’s thesis embeds legal–political morality within the
notion of ‘civil peace’: ‘the public morality of legal–political government [is] a
morality concerned only with fostering widespread appreciable civil peace’
(p. 66). Thus, climate change is understood to be ‘a governmental problem and
not a moral problem’ (p. 127). Where the thesis engages the notion of morality
outside of legal–political government it is to reject it; however as it does so the
text displays a continual tendency to treat ‘morality’ and ‘religion’ as one part
of the same whole. Thus, legal–political government is not ‘government by reli-
gion-and-morality’ (p. 41, emphasis added), and citizens are safeguarded by
legal–political government from ‘the constant threat that they might be killed
simply for their religious/moral commitments’ (p. 67, emphasis added); and so on.
In layering up a strong rhetorical ‘religion and morality’ interconnection, the






























opportunity to engage with classic areligious notions of natural law cannot arise;
for example, the argument that moral understanding can be achievable through
reason, or the argument that morality exists in nature.
Lastly, Chapter 3 makes a brave attempt to address what the authors describe
as ‘the story of how an unlikely intersection of aesthetics and science, formed
around the notion of nature, eventually produced a particular object for legal–
political government which . . . we now call the environment’ (p. 45). The
authors draw upon several aesthetic schools in order to develop their argument.
In particular, they engage with ‘The Picturesque Tradition’ (pp. 48–50), but it is
not ultimately clear how the picturesque obsession with idealized beauty inter-
sects with rational science (nor indeed with the wider ‘anti-perfectionist’ dimen-
sion of legal–political government). The same point extends to ‘The Sublime
Tradition’ (pp. 50–51), a school of a frequently metaphysical and indeed ‘moral’
character rooted in a preoccupation with sublime transcendence. Similar pro-
blems trouble an exploration of ‘The Romantic Tradition’ (pp. 51–54), a movement
renowned for its reaction against enlightenment rationalism and its exaltation of
individual passion. Interlinking this artistic realm with the sphere of the scientist,
the authors claim that
[i]n the nineteenth century most scientists conducted the great bulk of
their studies of nature in a manner very similar to that employed by
those whose goal was pure aesthetic appreciation. Both groups relied
heavily on observation[.] (p. 57)
To carry this sort of argument the authors would be required to devote robust
attention to Realist schools of art, that is, those schools that exalted replication
of the real as a chief intention of art and that employed their craft as a means of
purposefully replicating nature/the environment; the romantic schools,
however, largely rejected this sort of Realist manifesto. Thus, the aesthetics-
science argument as formulated by the authors does not seem to hold.
Setting the book’s more problematic features aside, this is undeniably a very
well-written, thought-provoking work. It will prove both interesting and instruc-
tive for scholars engaged in exploration of the political and legal aspects of the
governance of the environment and climate change.
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